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Do Bitcoins make the world go round?
On the dynamics of competing crypto-currencies
S. Bornholdt1 and K. Sneppen2
1Institute for Theoretical Physics, University of Bremen, 28359 Bremen, Germany
2Niels Bohr Institute, Blegdamsvej 17, DK-2100 Copenhagen, Denmark
Bitcoins have emerged as a possible competitor to usual currencies, but other crypto-currencies
have likewise appeared as competitors to the Bitcoin currency. The expanding market of crypto-
currencies now involves capital equivalent to 1010 US Dollars, providing academia with an unusual
opportunity to study the emergence of value. Here we show that the Bitcoin currency in itself is
not special, but may rather be understood as the contemporary dominating crypto-currency that
may well be replaced by other currencies. We suggest that perception of value in a social system
is generated by a voter-like dynamics, where fashions form and disperse even in the case where
information is only exchanged on a pairwise basis between agents.
PACS numbers: 89.65.-s, 05.50.+q, 05.65.+b, 64.60.De
INTRODUCTION
The recent surge in interest and value of Bitcoins is
fuelled by lack of confidence in the usual banking sys-
tem and its lack of transparency. Currencies issued by
central banks are not conserved and printing money has
been a frequent response to various fiscal problems, abun-
dantly spanning, both, nations and centuries. In recent
years, the financial crisis led to bank bailouts and finan-
cial rescuing of whole nations, all at the expense of the
big central currencies. Even private assets in banks were
considered to be devaluated for the purpose of rescuing a
national financial system. In this context, the prospects
of a peer-to-peer currency without the need for a cen-
tral bank meets the desire of many people. The crypto-
currency Bitcoin, within only 5 years, has reached a mar-
ket capitalization equivalent to ten billion US Dollars and
therefore proves to be a popular new medium.
A major property of Bitcoins is its built-in limitation to
a finite number of currency units, called coins. 21,000,000
coins in total can be generated, not more. This is in
contrast to common currencies that can be printed in
secret by central banks or can be devaluated by exces-
sive issuing of loans. Cryptrographic methods ensure full
transparency of the absolute conservation of Bitcoins and
are therefore a considerable source of trust into this new
medium.
The large volatility of the Bitcoin currency, as well as
its low number of daily transactions and low trading vol-
ume, support arguments that Bitcoins do not yet share
the characteristics of a mature currency. And, further-
more, a major caveat has become clear in recent months:
While the number of coins in the new currency is con-
served, the overall number of crypto-currencies is not. As
the underlying software is open source, cloning a crypto-
currency is an easy matter, as is the release of a modified
version of a crypto-currency. Today, hundreds of crypto-
currencies can be found on the World Wide Web, and an
capitalization and daily trade  (US$)
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Figure 1: Estimated value of the 100 highest valued crypto-
currencies, using data from crypto-currency market capital-
ization from March 18, 2014 (coinmarketcap.com). Also the
figure shows the distribution of trade volumes at that day.
Both plots are cumulative, and exhibit a scaling over 2.5 or-
ders of magnitude with an exponent of about -0.5 (straight
line fits). Although the Bitcoin currency is by far the best
known crypto-currency, it does not distinguish itself from the
overall distribution of important crypto-currencies as, for ex-
ample, Litecoins or Dogecoins.
unknown large number may be waiting for acceptance
online.
As a result, the constant volume of Bitcoins faces an
unlimited number of alternative crypto-currencies and,
therefore, an unlimited number of alternative coins. It is
an interesting question whether this neutralizes the ad-
vantage of the finite inventory in Bitcoins. Clearly, an
investor may move his assets from Bitcoins to a com-
peting currency, thereby freely moving in a space with
an unlimited number of coins. A quick look at a cur-
rent crypto-currency exchange shows that so far Bitcoin
capitalization dominates.
Fig. 1 shows that the relative strength of the 100 most
valued crypto-currencies in fact does not distinguish Bit-
coin as special. Rather, both the total market capital-
ization and the number of trades vary as a power law,
2with the number of currencies exceeding M decrease as
1/M0.5±0.1. Thus the major advantage of the Bitcoin is
its historical position, but it could in principle as well be
replaced with any of its competitors.
Here we propose to view the value of any crypto-
currency from a popularity standpoint, where coins gain
foothold in a market because people communicate about
the currencies and thereby act according to the curren-
cies’ popularity. The simplest process that takes such
dynamics into account is the Moran process from evolu-
tionary biology [1], often rephrased as the Voter Model
in Sociophysics [2–4].
MODEL AND RESULTS
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Figure 2: Distribution of popularity in steady state of an iter-
ated voter- or Moran process, where mutually exclusive states
compete for N=10000 different sites. At each time-step one
chooses two sites at random and copies the state of one onto
the other site. In addition, each time a state is eliminated
from the system, another state is introduced by inserting it
at a random site, thereby replacing the previous state of that
site. The three curves refer to a constantly maintained diver-
sity of states of D = 10 (orange), D = 100 (dark grey), and
D = 1000 (light grey), respectively. The straight black line
has a slope of −1.
In terms of multiple currencies, a fashion process may
be modeled as a number of sites, each representing mem-
ory slots in one person’s mind. Naturally, there may be
more than one memory slots per person, representing the
possibility that this person knows about several crypto-
currencies, and also that this person perhaps allocates
more memory to Bitcoins than for example to Litecoins.
The update of this “fashion model” mimicks communi-
cation between two people, allowing one person to swap
the state of one memory slot with the state of another
memory slot from the other person. When a particular
coin is not present in any memory slot of any person, it is
considered to be eliminated. To generate a steady state
process we here allow invention of a new coin by introduc-
ing it into one memory slot. The process is simulated for
a N = 10000 system with a number of crypto-currencies
D = 10, giving a time averaged distribution of popularity
∝ 1/x, see Fig. 2.
The above copying process is a classical model from
sociology, implicitly suggested by Spencer in 1855 by his
famous statement of proportionality between importance
and how often people hear about a given subject [5].
From comparing the probability density Fig. 2 with the
cumulative plot in Fig. 1 we see qualitative agreement,
although the capitalization of real crypto-currencies is
decreasing faster with size than the model expectation.
Based on the Moran process above, we now want to
model a more complete market where agents also trade
currencies and where crypto-currencies are mined at a
constant rate. The latter mining aspect will be imple-
mented to mimic the long period of Bitcoins where a
constant amount of about 50.000 coins has been mined
per week. Our agent based model will remain simplified
in the sense that it only considers market fluctuations
related to peer to peer exchange, and further by consid-
ering only steady state properties.
Presentation and exchange of desires:                   Exchange of goods: 
agent 1
desires 
red:
agent 1 obtains red
by giving cyan:
Figure 3: Two basic elements in the exchange between two
randomly selected agents. First, on the left the two agents
present one of their desires each, based on their allocated
memories. The presented desire makes the opposing agents
replace a fraction of their memories accordingly [7, 8], thereby
mimicking the Voter/Moran-like process simulated in Fig. 2.
Second, on the right, agents may exchange goods, based on
their respective perception of the value of these goods. In our
suggested market dynamics we implement the value of a good
as being simply equal to the fraction of memory that an agent
has allocated to this good.
The model describes a market of N agents that in-
vest, mine, and trade in D different crypto-currencies.
The trades will occur between agents on a one-on-one
basis, always involving information exchange and occa-
sionally also exchange of coins. Each agent i has two
types of internal variables. First a repository for assets,
implemented as a vector ai(k) containing the respective
assets of currencies k = 1, ..., D. A second vector mi(j),
j = 1, ...,mem contains the preferences of the agent in
future acquisitions, with index number j containing a
memory mi(j) referring to one of the D currencies. Be-
low we also use the derived quantity Mi(k) that counts
the number of times currencies k = 1, 2...D appear in the
memory list of agent i. The model is defined in discrete
3trade steps:
• Communication: Select two different agents i1
and i2 and one memory slot from each ones’ mem-
ory, subsequently referred to as currency c1 and
currency c2. Let agents communicate by replac-
ing a random one of their own interest slots with
the selected interest slot from the other agent. If
one currency is not any more present in the mem-
ory of any agent, it is eliminated from the system
and a new currency is introduced in its place with
one coin unit and one memory slot of a randomly
selected agent.
• Trades: If agent i1 has coin c2 in his inventory
list and agent i2 has coin c1, then the two agents
may perform a trade, provided that both believe
to gain. Agent i1 evaluates the value of one c1
unit to be M1(c1) + 1, thereby also setting a lower
threshold for value of the currency. Similarly, agent
i1 evaluates the value of c2 as M1(2) + 1, whereas
agent i2 estimates the value of c1 and c2 respec-
tively to M2(1) and M2(2). A transfer of y num-
bers of c2 coins from i1 → i2 and x number of c1
coins i2 → i1 can take place if M1(c1)/M1(c2) >
M2(c1)/M2(c2) with exchange rate p = y/x =√
M1(c1) ·M2(c1)/(M1(c2) ·M2(c2)). At the ex-
change, the maximal possible exchange is taking
place: If a1(c2) > p · a2(c1) then x = a2(c1)
and y = p · a2(c1). If a1(c2) < p · a2(c1) then
x = a1(c2)/p and y = a1(c2).
• Mining: With a small probability all currencies
are mined, and each agent i increases its amount
of currency c at a rate proportional to the fraction
that this currency fills the memory of i, divided
by the total memory of all agents allocated to this
currency. Thereby, each currency is mined at a
constant rate, whereas individual agents will find
it much harder to mine popular currencies.
Notice that trading deals with any fractions of coins, and
accordingly the overall behavior, is independent of abso-
lute numbers of coins in the game, including the mining
rates in step 3. Also note that there is no feedback from
the trade step to the updating dynamics of the memo-
ries, leaving the underlying fluctuation in popularity to
be very close to the multi-species Moran process simu-
lated in Fig. 2, implying that the overall dynamics of
global memory of a particular currency will be close to a
Moran process.
Fig. 5 illustrates the typical behavior of the model,
with emphasis on the basic processes: attention, mining,
capitalization and trading. All time courses are shown in
units of exchange between N = 100 pairs of agents, each
with mem = 10 memory slots, trading D = 10 different
crypto-currencies. In A) we see that dominance is not
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Figure 4: Dynamics of a model simulation with N = 100,
a constantly maintained number of D = 10 different crypto-
currencies, and mem = 10 memory slots per agent. a) Rep-
resentation of the different currencies in the memories of the
agents, measuring their popularity with time. b) The number
of coins of various currencies, as they get mined steadily dur-
ing the lifetime of each crypto-currency. A crypto currency
is removed when it no longer appears in the memory of any
agent, and a new crypto-currency is then introduced by as-
signing one coin and one memory unit into one random agent
in the system. c) Capitalization of each currency, defined as
its total attention multiplied by the total number of coins. d)
Wealth of agents, using the trading scheme in the text where
goods are exchanged by using a local value of currency i equal
to Mi + 1 where Mi is the memory of the agent allocated to
coin i. As in the previous plot, the grey area marks the most
wealthy agent in the system.
secured. Due to the ongoing introduction of new cur-
rencies the memory allocated to also dominating curren-
cies will be under constant challenge, and ultimately the
dominance is predicted to shift. At the same time, some
currencies get forgotten, to allow for new currencies with
mining allowing their coin count to increase linearly, as
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Figure 5: Distribution of attention and capitalization when
sampling more than 105 updates per agent in the system,
and collecting data after a transient of 20000 time-steps. Pa-
rameters are the same as in the previous figure. Notice in
particular that the scaling of capitalization is close to that of
the popularity (memory) of the currencies.
seen in panel B). Panel C) shows the total capitalization
of currencies, a quantity that for each currency is equal
to its total attention multiplied with its total coin count.
Panel D) finally shifts the focus to the agents’ trading
and mining the currencies, a plot that illustrates that
fluctuating currencies indeed open for a market where
people may get rich, but as well may get poor. The over-
all steady state wealth distribution is found to be close to
log-normal (not shown), as the individual agents’ fortune
is the result of a partly multiplicative process of success
and failures.
Fig. 5 shows that the distributions of both attention
(memory) and total capitalization remain close to the
overall expectation of an iterated Moran process, i.e.
∝ 1/x. Also the figure shows that trading volumes in-
deed follow a similar scaling, with large trades being as-
sociated to an exchange of popular currencies. Overall,
the scale free distributions of real crypto-currencies are
recapitulated, with the caveat that our model shows a
substantially broader distribution than the observed dis-
tributions.
DISCUSSION
This paper proposes to study the emergent crypto-
currencies as a model system of emerging and compet-
ing values. Emergence of value and money is an old and
classical problem in economic literature, starting with
Mengen [6] and later modelled through an interplay be-
tween need and fashion by [7, 8]. In fact the above trad-
ing model shares the communication step with [8], but
does not couple the distribution of goods among agents
to their value assessment, a coupling that would expect to
be more strategic than a need for diversification. Crypto-
currencies provide us with a fresh model system, present-
ing a real world phenomena of value that has emerged
without any need or fundamental value at all. The ap-
parent rise of Bitcoins to the status of a currency which
already now can be used to buy real products on the
World Wide Web, thus indeed emphasizes that money is
a social concept that can self-organize from simple con-
tacts between people.
Our model is at its core simplistic, re-iterating the ba-
sic fact that all crypto-currencies are inherently inter-
changeable and well may be reshuffled by future con-
tingencies. Our model fails to give the same exponent
as observed for the power law scaling of real crypto-
currencies, and instead predicts systematically broader
distributions. Said differently, the contemporary domi-
nance of Bitcoin is in fact less than one would typically
expect of a voter- or Moran-like underlying social dynam-
ics.
Possible limitations of our model may be in particular
the possibility to obtain more dramatically fluctuating
fashion dynamics, caused by an interplay between global
information spreading, marketing, or including propaga-
tion of potentially catastrophic news. Thus other types
of preferential growth of attention may be considered,
for example the rich-gets-richer dynamics by Simon [9]
with an overall prediction of a wealth distribution with
scaling exponent steeper than -2, which would be sys-
tematically steeper than the observed distribution. Also
we here have abstained from modeling the transient as-
pect of real crypto-currencies. This allowed us to model
a distribution that does depend on the functional form
of the abundance of new currencies. An introduction
that indeed should be expected to give an abundance of
yet small currencies, and reduce the relative abundance
of bigger currencies. Finally, the social network aspect
of emergent crypto-currencies may contribute to the ex-
ponent, as information and trust about small currencies
may be localized in certain regions of the human social
network [10], which is potentially quantifiable by follow-
ing transactions of crypto-currencies, as well as informa-
tion flows about the currencies [11, 12].
Overall, our consideration serves to emphasize the
crypto-currency as a good model-system for the study
of human folly, including the history-dependent random-
ness in assigning what is valuable and what has no value.
A consideration that should be at the heart of multiple
aspects of social activity, social hierarchies, and thereby
also be part of maintaining overall social order.
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